Raymond v. Idaho State Police Respondent\u27s Brief Dckt. 46272 by unknown
Electronically Filed 
5/3/2019 3:56 PM 
Idaho Supreme Court 
Karel Lehrman, Clerk of the Court 
By: Brad Thies, Deputy Clerk 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
JACKIE RAYMOND, individually as an heir, 




IDAHO STATE POLICE, an Idaho State 
agency, PAYETTE COUNTY, a political 
subdivision of the State of Idaho, and SCOTT 
SLOAN, 
Defendants. 
Idaho Supreme Court Docket No. 
46272-2018 
Payette County District Court 
Case No. CV-2015-00954 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
Appeal from the Third Judicial District Court of the State of Idaho 
in and for the County of Payette 
Honorable Christopher S. Nye, District Judge, Presiding 
Michael J. Elia 
Marisa S. Crecelius 
MOORE, ELIA, KRAFT & HALL, LLP 
Post Office Box 6756 
Boise, Idaho 83707 
Telephone: (208) 336-6900 
Attorneys for Respondent Idaho State Police 
Nathan M. Olsen 
PETERSEN MOSS HALL & OLSEN 
485 "E" Street 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402 
Attorneys for Appellant, Jackie M Raymond 
i 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ....................................................................................................... 1 
ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL ............................................................................................... 4 
ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL .................................................................................................. 4 
ARGUMENT .................................................................................................................................. 5 
I. Standard of review ........................................................................................................... 5 
 
II. The district court did not err when it dismissed Plaintiff’s claim for intentional 
interference with a prospective civil action against ISP because Idaho has not 
recognized such a tort and Ms. Raymond does not have standing to pursue such a claim.
.......................................................................................................................................... 6 
 
A. A claim for intentional spoliation has not been recognized in Idaho ..................... 6 
 
B. Ms. Raymond’s alleged injury is based on pure speculation and therefore she does 
not have standing to pursue her claim against ISP ................................................. 9 
 
III. This Court should not adopt a new tort for intentional interference with a civil action by 
spoliation of evidence because such a tort would create endless litigation and because 
the facts of this case do not support such a tort. ............................................................ 12 
 
A. The adoption of intentional interference with a prospective civil action will lead to 
endless, burdensome litigation. ............................................................................. 12 
 
B. Other remedies are available to deter the destruction of evidence. ...................... 15 
 
C. The facts of this case do not merit the adoption of a new tort in Idaho. ............... 16 
 
IV. The district court properly dismissed Ms. Raymond’s claim for tortious interference 
with economic advantage. .............................................................................................. 18 
 






TABLE OF CASES & AUTHORITIES 
Cases 
Bergeman v. Select Portfolio Servicing, 164 Idaho 498, 432 P.3d 47 (2018) ................................ 4 
Bromley v. Garey, 132 Idaho 807, 979 P.2d 1165 (1999) .............................................................. 8 
Cedars-Sinai Med. Ctr. v. Superior Court, 954 P.2d 511 (Cal. 1998) ................................7, 12, 13  
Coal. for Agric.’s Future v. Canyon Cty., 160 Idaho 142, 369 P.3d 920 (2016) ............................ 9 
Cook v. State, Dep't of Transp., 133 Idaho 288, 985 P.2d 1150 (1999) ......................................... 8 
Courtney v. Big O Tires, Inc., 139 Idaho 821, 87 P.3d 930 (2003) ................................................ 8 
Cron v. Zimmer, 296 P.3d 567 (Ore. 2013) .................................................................................. 20 
Dowdle Butane Gas Co. v. Moore, 831 So. 2d 1124 (Miss. 2002)............................................... 14 
Federated Mut. Ins. Co. v. Litchfield Precision Components, Inc.,  
   456 N.W.2d 434 (Minn.1990).................................................................................................... 14 
   
Fox v. Country Mut. Ins. Co., 7 P.3d 677 (Ore. 2000).................................................................. 20 
Hagy v. State, 137 Idaho 618, 51 P.3d 432  (Ct. App. 2002) ................................................. 16, 17 
Hannah v. Heeter, 584 S.E.2d 560 (W.Va.2003) ................................................................... 16, 17 
Hazen v. Municipality of Anchorage, 718 P.2d 456 (Alaska 1986) ..................................... 7, 8, 16 
Highland Enterprises, Inc. v. Barker, 133 Idaho 330, 986 P.2d 996 (1999) .................... 19, 20, 21 
Hills v. United Parcel Serv., 232 P.3d 1049  (Utah 2010) ............................................................ 18 
Hurtado v. Land O'Lakes, Inc., 153 Idaho 13, 278 P.3d 415 (2012) ............................................ 18 
Idaho Wool Growers Ass’n, Inc. v. State, 154 Idaho 716, 302 P.3d 341 (2012) ............................ 5 
Koplin v. Rosel Well Perforators, Inc., 734 P.2d 1177 (Kan. 1987) ............................................ 14 
Martin v. Camas Cty. ex rel. Bd. Comm’rs, 150 Idaho 508, 248 P.3d 1243 (2011) ..................... 11 
Oliver v. Stimson Lumber Co., 993 P.2d 11 (Mont. 1999) ..................................................... 16, 17 
iii 
 
O'Neal v. Remington Arms Co., LLC, No. CIV. 11-4182-KES, 2012 WL 3834842, at *3 (D.S.D. 
Sept. 4, 2012) ............................................................................................................................ 14 
 
Ricketts v. E. Idaho Equip., Co., 137 Idaho 578, 51 P.3d 392 (2002) ...................................... 8, 15 
Rizzuto v. Davidson Ladders, Inc., 905 A.2d 1165 (Conn. 2006) .......................................... 16, 17 
Seiniger Law Office, P.A. v. N. Pac. Ins. Co., 145 Idaho 241, 178 P.3d 606 (2008) ............. 10, 11 
Smith v. Superior Court, 151 Cal. App. 3d 491, 198 Cal. Rptr. 829 (Ct. App. 1984) .............. 7, 12 
Stanley v. McDaniel, 134 Idaho 630, 7 P.3d 1107 (2000) .............................................................. 4 
State v. Philip Morris, Inc., 158 Idaho 874, 354 P.3d 187 (2015) ............................................ 9, 11 
Stiles v. Amundson, 160 Idaho 530, 376 P.3d 734 (2016) .............................................................. 4 
Syringa Networks, LLC v. Idaho Dep’t of Admin., 155 Idaho 55, 305 P.3d 499 (2013) .............. 20 
Taylor v. McNichols, 149 Idaho 826, 243 P.3d 642 (2010) ............................................................ 5 
Temple Cmty. Hosp. v. Superior Court, 976 P.2d 223 (1999) .................................... 12, 13, 14, 15 
 
Trevino v. Ortega, 969 S.W.2d 950 (Tex.1998) ........................................................................... 14 
Trilogy Network Sys., Inc. v. Johnson, 144 Idaho 844, 172 P.3d 1119 (2007) ............................. 20 
Waters v. All Phase Const., 156 Idaho 259,  322 P.3d 992 (2014) ................................................. 8 
Wesco Autobody Supply, Inc. v. Ernest, 149 Idaho 881, 243 P.3d 1069 (2010) ........................... 20 
Wimer v. State, 122 Idaho 923, 841 P.2d 453 (Ct. App. 1992) .................................................... 17 
Yoakum v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 129 Idaho 171, 923 P.2d 416 (1996) .............................. passim 
Other Authorities 
18 U.S.C. § 1512 ........................................................................................................................... 15 
I.C. § 12-121 ................................................................................................................................... 4 
I.C. § 18-2603 ............................................................................................................................... 15 
I.C. § 18-2604 ............................................................................................................................... 15 
I.C. § 18-2605 ............................................................................................................................... 15 
iv 
 
Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 870, 871.................................................................................... 7 
Rules 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) .......................................................................... 1, 3, 5, 6, 9 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54 ................................................................................................... 4 






STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This appeal stems from the district court’s dismissal of Plaintiff-Appellant Jackie
Raymond’s claims against Defendant-Respondent Idaho State Police (ISP). Ms. Raymond’s
underlying Complaint sets forth two alternate causes 0f action against ISP regarding their
investigation 0f a motor vehicle accident involving Ms. Raymond’s father and Fayette Deputy
Scott Sloan.1 R. V01. I, pp. 34-35, W 23-31. Those causes 0f action are specifically entitled:
Count H, “Tortious Interference with Prospective Action” and Count III (in the alternative)
“Tortious Interference with Prospective Economic Advantage.” Id. The district court dismissed
both claims against ISP for failure to state a claim pursuant t0 Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6).
In support 0f her claims, Ms. Raymond’s Complaint sets forth, in three paragraphs,
allegations against all “defendants.” R. Vol. I, pp. 32-33, 1N 17-19. Ms. Raymond alleges that,
that during ISP’S investigation 0f the accident, all defendants conspired to interfere or impede or
influence the criminal investigation of Deputy Sloan. Id. Ms. Raymond further alleges that the
defendants’ acts “thereby reduced the value of Plaintiff’s claim and increased the cost in
pursuing the claim.” V01. I, p. 32, 11 19. Specifically, in paragraph 19 0f her Complaint, Ms.
Raymond relies 0n a chain 0f hypotheticals t0 demonstrate that she was injured by defendants’
alleged interference in the criminal investigation:
[D]efendants conspired t0, and did, conceal and manipulate evidence, intimidate
Witnesses, and otherwise interfered with the prosecution, thereby causing the
prosecutor t0 dismiss the charges. But for the defendants’ cover-up and
interference as alleged herein, the matter would have proceeded to trial and Sloan
would have been convicted. Such conviction would have rendered liability in this
1 Deputy Sloan and Fayette County remained defendants in the underlying civil wrongfill
death lawsuit after ISP’S dismissal. A stipulated judgment for dismissal was entered after Ms.
Raymond subsequently reached a settlement with those defendants.
matter resjudiciata. The absence 0f such a conviction exponentially increased the
cost of proving liability in Plaintiff’s civil case and because 0f the defendants’
evidence tampering has made it more difficult t0 prove liability, making
Plaintiff’s civil claim significantly less valuable than it otherwise would have
been.
V01. I, p. 32, 1] 19 (underline emphasis added).
In Count II, Ms. Raymond asserts that defendants were “negligent per se” under Idaho
State and Federal criminal statutes and willfully destroyed or concealed evidence in an effort to
“disrupt Plaintiff’s case.” R. V01. I, p. 34, W 24-27. Ms. Raymond describes such disruption as
“a massive increase in costs 0f pursuing liability 0f the wrongful death claims, a potential loss in
the value of the claim, accruing interest from the significant delay in resolution 0f the claim, and
general damages, including severe emotional distress.” R. V01. I, p. 34, 1] 27. Similarly, in Count
III, Ms. Raymond alleges that she had a valid economic expectation Which was reduced,
destroyed, 0r disrupted by defendants’ interference. R. V01. I, p. 35, 1N 29-30. As a result, Ms.
Raymond asserts her “ability t0 obtain legal redress for [her] injuries has been significantly
impaired.” R. V01. I, p. 35, 1] 31.
Upon motion by the defendants for failure t0 state a claim, the district court dismissed
Count II for tortious interference With a prospective action and Count III for tortious interference
With an economic advantage. R. V01. I, pp. 112-113. The district court dismissed Count II
because it found that Idaho has not recognized a cause of action for tortious interference with
prospective action. R. V01. I, pp. 111-1 12. Recognizing the existence 0f the tort 0f interference
with an economic advantage, the district court nevertheless dismissed Count III, concluding that
“a civil lawsuit does not represent the kind 0f noncommercial relationship and prospective
economic advantage protected by the tort 0f intentional interference With an economic
advantage.” R. V01. I, p. 113. The district court went 0n t0 hold that dismissal 0f both Counts II
and III was appropriate because those claims were each “premised 0n a fact that the Plaintiff
cannot prove: that but for the Defendants’ alleged misconduct, Sloan would have been convicted
0f manslaughter.” Id. The district court determined that “speculating about one possible outcome
in Sloan’s criminal case is not a basis for relief in this civil case.” Id.
On August 17, 2018, Ms. Raymond filed her Notice of Appeal, implying that she
intended t0 appeal the district court’s dismissal Counts II and III 0f her Complaint. Ms.
Raymond described the preliminary statement 0f the issues 0n appeal as: “Did the district court
err in dismissing the plaintiff’s tortious interference claims against defendant Idaho State Police
under Rule 12(b)(6) 0f the Idaho Rules 0f Civil Procedure?” R. V01. 1., p. 125, 1] 3A (emphasis
added). Similarly, Ms. Raymond’s Nature 0f the Case section 0f her Appellant’s Brief states that
she “appeals the decision 0f the district court t0 dismiss herm against defendant Idaho State
Police (ISP) ...” Appellant’s Brief, p. 4 (emphasis added).
The Issues Presented on Appeal in Ms. Raymond’s Appellant’s Brief, however,M
reference the dismissal of Count III, tortious interference With economic advantage. See
Appellant’s Brief, p. 8. Similarly, Ms. Raymond’s Appellant’s Brief is devoid 0f any argument
that the dismissal of Count III was error. See, e.g., Appellant’s Brief, pp. 10-13. The first
argument section 0f her brief is entitled, “The Complaint States Sufficient Facts t0 Support a
Claim of Intentional Interference with Prospective Civil Action by Spoliation 0f Evidence.”
Appellant’s Brief, pp. 10. Ms. Raymond does not argue that her Complaint’s allegations
sufficiently stated a claim for the existent tort of interference with economic advantage. At most,
Ms. Raymond makes vague references that her Complaint pled “an allowable and recognized
claim 0r claims.” See, e.g. Appellants Brief, p. 9. Ms. Raymond’s second main argument 0n
appeal asks this Court t0 fashion a new tort from “ISP’S intentional 0r reckless conduct as
alleged. . .” Appellant’s Brief, p. 15.
Thus, ISP cannot prepare a full response t0 Ms. Raymond’s vague assertions that the
district court erred by dismissing its tortious interference claims. Furthermore, “[r]egardless 0f
whether an issue is explicitly set forth in the party’s brief as one 0f the issues 0n appeal, if the
issue is only mentioned in passing and not supported by any cogent argument or authority, it
cannot be considered by this Court.” Bergeman v. Select Portfolio Servicing, 164 Idaho 498, 432
P.3d 47, 50 (2018)(internal citations omitted). Nevertheless, in an abundance 0f caution, ISP Will
address the district court’s dismissal 0f Count III in Section IV, below.
ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL
Defendant ISP presents the following additional issue 0n appeal:
Has Ms. Raymond pursued this appeal frivolously, unreasonably, and without foundation,
therefore entitling Defendant ISP to attorney fees and costs 0n appeal?
ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL
ISP should be awarded attorney fees and costs on appeal pursuant to Idaho Appellate
Rules 41, Idaho Rule 0f Civil Procedure 54, and Idaho Code §12-121. Attorney fees and costs 0n
appeal are appropriate under I.A.R. 41, I.R.C.P. 54(e)(1), and I.C. § 12-121, only if this Court is
left with the abiding belief that the appeal was brought or pursued frivolously, unreasonably, and
without foundation. Stanley v. McDaniel, 134 Idaho 630, 633, 7 P.3d 1107, 1110 (2000) Where
an appeal turns 0n questions of law, an award of attorney fees under these sections is proper if
the law is well settled and the appellant has made no substantial showing that the district court
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misapplied the law. Id.; see also, Stiles v. Amundson, 160 Idaho 530, 534, 376 P.3d 734, 738 
(2016) (arguments must be well-reasoned and have at least some precedential support).  
Here, Ms. Raymond has not pointed to any misapplication of the law by the district court. 
Further, Ms. Raymond asks this Court to change well-established law and adopt a cause of action 
based on hypotheticals and damages that cannot be proven on the facts of this case. Ms. 
Raymond’s appeal was also brought without foundation because, despite her contentions to the 
contrary, she has pursued and reached a settlement with the other defendants in the underlying 
case, thereby mooting any argument that ISP’s alleged actions or inactions interfered with or 
terminated her right to recovery in that case. Attorney fees are further warranted because this 
appeal inappropriately seeks to re-litigate issues that have been resolved by a settlement with 
other parties to the underlying case.  
ARGUMENT 
 I. Standard of review 
 
 This Court reviews an order dismissing an action pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to 
state a claim, de novo.  Taylor v. McNichols, 149 Idaho 826, 832, 243 P.3d 642, 648 (2010). Rule 
8(a)(2) requires a complaint to contain a “a short and plain statement of the claim” showing that 
the plaintiff is entitled to relief. Thus, on review of a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, this Court 
determines whether the non-moving party has alleged sufficient facts in support of their claim, 
which if true, would entitle them to relief. Idaho Wool Growers Ass’n, Inc. v. State, 154 Idaho 
716, 720, 302 P.3d 341, 345 (2012) (internal citations and quotations omitted). “In doing so, the 
Court draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party.” Id.  
 
II. The district court did not err when it dismissed Plaintiff’s claim for
intentional interference With a prospective civil action against ISP because
Idaho has not recognized such a tort and Ms. Raymond does not have
standing t0 pursue such a claim.
Ms. Raymond acknowledges that the tort of intentional interference With a prospective
civil action has not been adopted as an independent cause 0f action by Idaho courts. Appellant’s
Brief, p. 10. When dismissing Ms. Raymond’s claim, the district court acknowledged this fact
and declined to recognize a new tort, within its discretion. R. Vol. I, p. 112. Accordingly,
because n0 such independent tort exists under Idaho law, Ms. Raymond’s Complaint failed t0
state an appropriate claim under Rule 12(b)(6) and was properly dismissed. Even if such an
independent cause of action existed in Idaho, Ms. Raymond’s tortious interference with
prospective civil action claim was supported by only conclusory, speculative allegations, and her
alleged injury was based 0n several hypotheticals. Ms. Raymond failed t0 establish that she had
standing t0 bring her claim, Which further warrants its dismissal as a matter of law.
A. A claim for intentional spoliation has not been recognized in Idaho.
Ms. Raymond argues that the tort 0f intentional interference With a civil action by
spoliation of evidence, While not formally adopted, has been recognized by Idaho courts, and
therefore, the district court’s dismissal was in error. Ms. Raymond relies upon a 1996 Idaho
Supreme Court case, Yoakum v. Hartford Fire Ins. C0., 129 Idaho 171, 173, 923 P.2d 416, 418
(1996), for the proposition that the tort 0f intentional interference With a civil action is an
actionable tort in Idaho. A careful reading of Yoakum reveals that this Court did not adopt such a
tort.
In Yaakum, parents 0f a minor sued a city’s insurance company, alleging that the insurer
committed wrongful, criminal acts in its investigation of the minor’s wrongful death claim. 129
Idaho at 174, 923 P.2d at 419. Specifically, the parents alleged that an insured’s private
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investigator improperly changed his initial causation opinions and that the insurer’s claims 
manager inappropriately contacted and threatened an underage witness. Id. Before bringing their 
suit against the insurer, the parents brought a wrongful death claim against the city, which they 
settled by accepting the city’s offer of judgment. Id. After settling the wrongful death claim, the 
parents filed suit against the insurer asserting various causes of action, including spoliation of 
evidence, intentional harm to a property interest, and violations of several criminal statutes. Id.  
 The district court dismissed the parents’ claims that were based on criminal statutes and 
later awarded summary judgment to the insurer on the remaining civil claims. Id. at 174-75, at 
419-20. The parents appealed the district court’s dismissal of their claims and this Court 
affirmed. Id., at 180, at 425. Specifically concerning the parents’ claim for “spoliation of 
evidence,” this Court recognized that such a tort had not been expressly adopted in Idaho. Id., at 
177-78, at 422-23. Nevertheless, the Court went on to find that an essential element of that claim 
was not present; namely, that the insurer willfully destroyed evidence. Id., at 178, at 423. The 
Court declined to adopt a tort of intentional harm to a property interest due to the circumstances 
of that case, despite the “guidelines” available in the Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 870, 871, 
for “fashioning the contours of new intentional torts a court may wish to create.” Id.  
 In dicta, this Court took “the opportunity to opine on a possible cause of action for 
conduct more egregious than that presented here.” Id. Relying on a California Court of Appeal 
case (Smith v. Superior Court, 151 Cal. App. 3d 491, 500, 198 Cal. Rptr. 829, 835 (Ct. App. 
1984), disapproved of by Cedars-Sinai Med. Ctr. v. Superior Court, 954 P.2d 511 (1998), and a 
Supreme Court of Alaska case (Hazen v. Municipality of Anchorage, 718 P.2d 456, 463 (Alaska 
1986)), the Court analogized the “possible” cause of action for “intentional interference with 
prospective civil action by spoliation of evidence” to the tort of “intentional interference with a 
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prospective economic advantage,” which had been previously recognized in Idaho. Id., at 178-
79, at 423-24. Relying on Hazen, this Court opined that, even if it were to recognize the tort of 
spoliation, the record before it did not reveal that the insurer’s threatening and coercive conduct 
was an unreasonable interference with the parent’s previously-settled wrongful death claim. Id., 
at 179, at 424.  
This Court has continued to hold that the tort of spoliation had not been expressly 
adopted in Idaho. See Ricketts v. E. Idaho Equip., Co., 137 Idaho 578, 581, 51 P.3d 392, 395–96 
(2002) (disposal of evidence did not show the requisite plan or premeditation to establish 
spoliation); Cook v. State, Dep't of Transp., 133 Idaho 288, 298, 985 P.2d 1150, 1160 (1999) 
(spoliation claim alleging defendant had intentionally or negligently “secreted, destroyed, lost or 
mislaid” evidence was dismissed for failure to file a tort claim). In yet other cases decided after 
Yoakum, this Court recognized the “spoliation doctrine,” not as an independent tort, but rather as 
a “general principle of civil litigation which provides that upon a showing of intentional 
destruction of evidence by an opposing party, an inference arises that the missing evidence was 
adverse to the party’s position.” Waters v. All Phase Const., 156 Idaho 259, 263, 322 P.3d 992, 
996 (2014). See also, Courtney v. Big O Tires, Inc., 139 Idaho 821, 823, 87 P.3d 930, 932 
(2003); Bromley v. Garey, 132 Idaho 807, 812, 979 P.2d 1165, 1170 (1999). 
In each case where the destruction or concealment of evidence was alleged to have taken 
place, this Court declined to expressly adopt the tort of intentional interference with a civil action 
by spoliation of evidence. Indeed, Idaho courts have never recognized spoliation in the context 
presented in the instant appeal – when a plaintiff alleges that a third party’s alleged “spoliation” 
in a criminal prosecution constituted intentional interference with a plaintiff’s prospective civil 
action. Accordingly, because Idaho has not expressly recognized the tort of interference with a 
prospective civil action, the district court did not err by dismissing Count II 0f Ms. Raymond’s
Complaint for failure to state a claim.
B. Ms. Raymond’s alleged injury is based on pure speculation and therefore
she does not have standing t0 pursue her claim against ISP.
Even if that such a claim has been recognized in Idaho, Ms. Raymond has not alleged
sufficient facts, which, if true, would entitle her to relief. See I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6). Specifically, Ms.
Raymond lacks standing t0 pursue her claim for intentional interference 0f a prospective civil
action, as her allegations d0 not demonstrate an injury-in-fact.
This Court recently described the requirement 0f standing, as follows:
It is a fundamental tenet 0f American Jurisprudence that a person Wishing t0
invoke a court’s jurisdiction must have standing. In order t0 satisfy the
requirement 0f standing, a petitioner must allege 0r demonstrate an injury in fact
and a substantial likelihood that the judicial relief requested Will prevent 0r
redress the claimed injury. Standing requires a showing 0f a distinct palpable
injury and fairly traceable causal connection between the claimed injury and the
challenged conduct. This Court has defined palpable injury as an injury that is
easily perceptible, manifest, 0r readily Visible. The injury cannot be one suffered
alike by all citizens in the jurisdiction. There must be a fairly traceable causal
connection between the claimed injury and the challenged conduct. An interest, as
a concerned citizen, in seeing that the government abides by the law does not
confer standing.
Coal. for Agric. ’s Future v. Canyon Cly., 160 Idaho 142, 146, 369 P.3d 920, 924 (2016)(interna1
citations and quotations omitted). Furthermore, standing can never be assumed based on a
merely hypothetical injury. State v. Philip Morris, Ina, 158 Idaho 874, 882, 354 P.3d 187, 195
(2015). “Indeed, when standing is challenged, mere allegations are not sufficient, and the party
invoking the court’s jurisdiction must demonstrate facts supporting this allegation.” Id.
The allegations in Ms. Raymond’s Complaint do not show a “fairly traceable causal
connection between the claimed injury and the challenged conduct,” and are based 0n several
hypotheticals. For example, Ms. Raymond speculates that, but for ISP’s alleged interference, not
only would have the prosecutor chosen to prosecute Deputy Sloan, a jury would have convicted
him, Which would have made Ms. Raymond’s civil case against Deputy Sloan easier t0 prove,
and would have resulted in a plaintiff’s verdict (in a case 0f comparative fault), lower attorney
fees, and higher damages in her wrongful death case. Ms. Raymond explicitly relies 0n these
hypotheticals in support of her claims and does not cite t0 any facts, beyond speculation, t0
establish that she has suffered an actual injury due t0 ISP’S alleged conduct.
Furthermore, Ms. Raymond’s Complaint does not describe any individual act by ISP t0
support her allegations of misconduct. Ms. Raymond does not identify a witness 0r piece 0f
evidence that was allegedly tampered with. While this Court must liberally construe Ms.
Raymond’s Complaint to “secure a just, speedy and inexpensive resolution of the case,” Seiniger
Law Office, P.A. v. N. Pac. Ins. C0., 145 Idaho 241, 246, 178 P.3d 606, 611 (2008), Ms.
Raymond asks this Court t0 ignore the actual language contained in the Complaint, wherein she
specifically alleges that ISP’S conduct prevented a prosecutor from charging Deputy Sloan and,
in turn, prevented a jury from convicting him, Which made her wrongful death case more
difficult t0 prove. Reading the Complaint as Ms. Raymond urges on appeal does not secure a
just, speedy, and inexpensive resolution 0f the case. Rather, finding a cause of action based on
the language 0f Ms. Raymond’s Complaint would inappropriately invite a jury to speculate about
decisions made by a prosecutor not to pursue criminal charges and the outcome of a hypothetical
criminal trial.
The district court correctly found that Ms. Raymond’s claims against ISP were premised
on pure speculation, which could not form a lawful basis for a valid claim. R. Vol. 1, p. 113. In
other words, Ms. Raymond’s claims were based 0n a conclusory and speculative hypothetical,




the prosecutor chosen to proceed with a criminal case, a jury would have convicted Deputy Sloan 
of manslaughter, resulting in a plaintiff’s verdict for Ms. Raymond, greater damages, and fewer 
costs in her civil case. See R. Vol. I, p. 33, ¶ 19.  
The district court also correctly held that Ms. Raymond’s claims were premature. R. Vol. 
1, p. 113. At the time of her lawsuit, Ms. Raymond had not yet suffered any injury, nor was she 
likely to, because the outcome of the civil case had not yet been decided. Id. In other words, 
because Ms. Raymond’s injury was predicated on the expense and outcome of her wrongful 
death claim, her Complaint did not demonstrate that she had suffered a distinct injury at the time 
of its filing, or that she was likely to suffer a distinct injury in the future. Accordingly, Ms. 
Raymond’s speculative allegations are not sufficient to demonstrate that she had suffered an 
injury-in-fact necessary to establish standing to pursue claims against ISP. See, Martin v. Camas 
Cty. ex rel. Bd. Comm’rs, 150 Idaho 508, 514, 248 P.3d 1243, 1249 (2011) (a plaintiff did not 
have standing because alleged injury of “increased competition” was “thoroughly speculative” 
and was not “specific or distinct and palpable.”). 
 Ms. Raymond’s allegations of “reduced damages” and “increased attorney fees” also do 
not constitute an “injury-in-fact” because they cannot be established by known facts. See, Philip 
Morris, Inc., 158 Idaho 874, 882, 354 P.3d 187, 195 (2015). To the contrary, the only way for 
Ms. Raymond to establish injury would be to compare the outcome of a hypothetical civil case 
that took place after a hypothetical criminal conviction, to the outcome of another civil case that 
has yet to take place. Such an alleged injury is not visible, palpable, distinct, or sufficient to 
establish standing. Rather, it is based on conjecture and guesswork. Accordingly, the district 
court did not err when it dismissed Ms. Raymond’s claim for tortious interference with a 
prospective civil action for failure to state a valid claim. 
III. This Court should not adopt a new tort for intentional interference with a
civil action by spoliation 0f evidence because such a tort would create endless
litigation and because the facts of this case d0 not support such a tort.
For several reasons, this Court should not adopt a new tort for intentional interference
With a civil action by spoliation of evidence. First, adoption of such a tort is likely to lead t0
endless litigation where the same facts and issues are contested in several different venues.
Second, other sufficient remedies are available to deter such interference, including criminal
laws punishing those Who conceal or destroy evidence 0r intimidate Witnesses. In addition, the
facts 0f this case d0 not warrant the adoption 0f a new cause tort for intentional interference with
a civil action.
A. The adoption 0f intentional interference With a prospective civil action
will lead t0 endless, burdensome litigation.
In Yoakum, this Court relied in part 0n Smith, supra, the seminal California case that first
recognized a claim for interference With a prospective civil action in 1984. The holding in Smith
was later disapproved in the “first-party spoliation” context. See, Cedars—Sinai Med. Ctr. v.
Superior Court, 954 P.2d 511, 521 & n. 4 (1998). Also after Yoakum, California flatly rejected
the tort 0f “third-party spoliation,” which is most akin to the circumstances of the instant appeal.
See Temple Cmty. Hosp. v. Superior Court, 976 P.2d 223, 225 (1999). A third-party spoliation
claim alleges destruction 0f evidence by someone Who is not alleged to have committed the
underlying tort — in this case, ISP would be considered a third party because Ms. Raymond did
not allege that ISP’S conduct proximately caused the accident resulting in her father’s death.
Rather, Ms. Raymond alleges that ISP’S conduct in the criminal investigation interfered with her
wrongful death case against Deputy Sloan and Fayette County.
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In Temple, the Court described the “endless spirals 0f lawsuits over litigation-related
conduct” that resulted With the adoption 0f intentional third-party spoliation claims. Id., 976 P.2d
at 229. The Court recognized the harm in depriving a party 0f evidence supporting their claim,
but nonetheless considered the “greater harm 0f subjecting parties, witnesses and the courts t0
unending litigation over the conduct and outcome 0f a lawsuit.” Id., at 230. It further identified
“the uncertainty 0f the fact 0f harm” that occurs in cases alleging third-party spoliation. Citing its
decision in Cedars-Sinai, supra, the Temple Court held:
As in the case 0f spoliation 0f evidence by a party, in the case 0f third party
spoliation “[i]t seems likely that in a substantial proportion 0f spoliation cases the
fact 0f harm will be irreducibly uncertain. In such cases, even if the jury infers
from the act of spoliation that the spoliated evidence was somehow unfavorable
[to a party], there Will typically be n0 way 0f telling What precisely the evidence
would have shown and how much it would have weighed in the spoliation
Victim’s favor. Without knowing the content and weight 0f the spoliated evidence,
it would be impossible for the jury t0 meaningfillly assess What role the missing
evidence would have played in the determination of the underlying action. The
jury could only speculate as t0 What the nature 0f the spoliated evidence was and
what effect it might have had on the outcome of the underlying litigation.
Id., at 230 (emphasis added).
The Court had further concerns about the element of causation being subject t0
speculation, stating that “the extent t0 which the destruction of evidence caused a different result
in the underlying litigation would be a matter 0f speculation.” Id. at 23 1. Ultimately, the Temple
Court held that California’s lower courts were mistaken in recognizing a tort of intentional
spoliation 0f evidence by analogizing it to the tort 0f intentional interference With prospective
economic advantage (which is precisely what the Yaakum Court did When it opined that such a
tort was “possible” in Idaho. Id., at 231). Considering all 0f these factors above, including




As we have seen, the injury in the case of spoliation is speculative. A litigant’s 
expectancy in the outcome of litigation is peculiarly uncertain, being subject to 
the discretion of court and jury. Whether interference with the prospective 
advantage of prevailing in a lawsuit is committed by a party to the litigation or 
instead by a stranger to the litigation, the claimed fact of damage — loss or 
impairment of a hoped-for civil verdict — is equally speculative. 
 
Id. The Temple Court acknowledged the additional burdens and costs of such a speculative cause 
of action, including jury confusion, potential for frivolous lawsuits, and the overall burden on the 
legal system, including the “inaccurate instrument of derivative tort litigation” and the 
“potentially endless litigation over a speculative loss” that would result from such claims. Id., at 
231-233.   
 The majority of jurisdictions who have addressed this issue have declined to adopt an 
intentional spoliation claim for the same or similar reasons set forth in Temple. See, Koplin v. 
Rosel Well Perforators, Inc., 734 P.2d 1177, 1183 (Kan. 1987) (tort of “intentional interference 
with a prospective civil action by spoliation of evidence” was not recognized, absent duty or 
special relationship of the parties); Federated Mut. Ins. Co. v. Litchfield Precision Components, 
Inc., 456 N.W.2d 434, 438-39 (Minn.1990) (declined to allow an independent tort to continue 
prior to resolution of the underlying case, due to concerns about speculation); Trevino v. Ortega, 
969 S.W.2d 950, 951–52 (Tex.1998) (declining to recognize a tort that would lead to duplicate 
litigation and insufficient re-litigation of the same issues); Dowdle Butane Gas Co. v. Moore, 
831 So. 2d 1124, 1135-36 (Miss. 2002) (declining to adopt the tort due to uncertainty of harm 
and interest of finality in adjudication); O'Neal v. Remington Arms Co., LLC, No. CIV. 11-4182-
KES, 2012 WL 3834842, at *3 (D.S.D. Sept. 4, 2012) (recognizing persuasive rationale by 
majority of states who have declined to adopt the new tort).  
This Court should likewise decline to adopt a new tort that would likely lead t0
burdensome, endless litigation over speculative loss. This is precisely What would occur should
Ms. Raymond be allowed to proceed on her claim.
B. Other remedies are available to deter the destruction of evidence.
Remedies exist to address the types of allegations that Ms. Raymond raises in her
Complaint. In particular, state and Federal criminal statutes outlaw the destruction of evidence,
tampering With Witnesses, and other forms 0f misconduct that Ms. Raymond alleges in her
Complaint. Indeed, she cites t0 the Violation 0f such statutes as “an element” 0f her claim for
intentional interference with a prospective Civil action. See, e.g. 18 U.S.C. § 1512 (federal
criminal statute prohibiting tampering With a Witness, Victim, 0r informant); LC. § 2603 (state
criminal statue prohibiting the destruction, alteration, 0r concealment of evidence); LC. § 2604
(state criminal statute prohibiting intimidation 0f a Witness); I.C. § 2605 (state criminal statute
prohibiting the bribery 0f witnesses)?
The Temple Court identified these existing remedies and further held that such cases 0f
third-party destruction 0f evidence were not a significant problem because “the nonparty who is
not acting on behalf of a party but is independently motivated to destroy evidence with the intent
to interfere in the outcome 0f litigation between other parties must be a rarity, perhaps because
such destruction can subject the nonparty to criminal prosecution.” Temple, 976 P.2d at 232.
That is particularly true in this case. Ms. Raymond does not allege that ISP acted 0n behalf 0f
Deputy Sloan 0r Fayette County With the requisite premeditation or plan t0 interfere in the
2 Despite the Complaint’s one random reference t0 “defendants” destroying evidence, Ms.
Raymond did not cite t0 I.C. § 18-2603 as a statute violated by ISP, Which further demonstrates
that Ms. Raymond’s Complaint has not properly alleged that ISP intentionally destroyed
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wrongful death lawsuit. Ricketts, 137 Idaho at 581, 51 P.3d at 395—96. Rather, the Complaint
relies on speculation and does not identify any valid motivation for ISP to conceal or destroy
evidence or otherwise interfere in the criminal investigation of Deputy Sloan.
C. The facts of this case do not merit the adoption of a new tort in Idaho.
A review of case law around the country has not revealed a similar case Where a plaintiff
established a cognizable claim for spoliation by alleging that third party interference prevented a
criminal conviction which thereby deprived the plaintiff of recovery in a subsequent civil case.
Indeed, other states Who have adopted this tort have not done so 0n those set 0f facts. See, Hazen,
supra (recognizing the tort in a case where an arrest tape was alleged t0 have been altered after
dismissal 0f criminal charges against plaintiff); Oliver v. Stimson Lumber C0., 993 P.2d 11, 22
(Mont. 1999) (recognizing the tort, but declining t0 find it when plaintiff could not establish that
defendant had intentionally destroyed evidence for the purpose of disrupting a third-party suit);
Hannah v. Heeter, 584 S.E.2d 560, 573 (W.Va.2003) (recognizing intentional tort, but
cautioning that party injured by spoliation must show more than the fact that the potential
evidence was destroyed — must show an intent to defeat a pending or potential lawsuit); Rizzuto
v. Davidson Ladders, Ina, 905 A.2d 1165, 1178 (Conn. 2006) (tort recognized When third party
destroyed ladder in a products liability case after repeated requests from plaintiff t0 preserve it).
Adopting a tort 0n the allegations raised in Ms. Raymond’s Complaint allows for any
party who disagrees with the outcome of a criminal investigation to assert a claim for
interference with a potential civil case down the road. As discussed above, that invites frivolous
lawsuits Where any investigator performing their job is subject t0 liability if the investigation
evidence, Which the Yoakum Court recognized was necessary t0 pursue such a claim. See 129
Idaho at 424, 923 P.2d at 179.
16
does not result in the indictmentw conviction 0f a party who may also be subject to liability in
a subsequent civil suit.3 In order to avoid such frivolous lawsuits and in order to establish a valid
claim for the type 0f “unreasonable interference” considered by the Yaakum Court, a plaintiff
must allege more than conclusory allegations of misconduct.
Ms. Raymond’s Complaint makes one random allegation of destruction 0f evidence,
Without any reference to ISP in particular, and does not identify the evidence allegedly destroyed
or how such evidence was Vital t0 her civil case. In other cases where spoliation was found to be
a valid claim, destruction 0f evidence was the main component and central allegation in the case.
See, e.g. Rizutto, supra; Hannah, supra; Oliver, supra. Furthermore, taking MS. Raymond’s
vague allegations as true and assuming that ISP destroyed evidence favorable t0 Ms. Raymond
and that all hypotheticals turn out in her favor, Deputy Sloan’s conviction does not guarantee her
a plaintiff’s verdict 0n her wrongful death claim, particularly in the context of comparative fault.
Accordingly, Ms. Raymond’s Complaint does not necessitate the adoption of a new tort on these
facts.
Importantly, and as discussed above, Ms. Raymond cannot establish injury-in-fact. Her
wrongful death lawsuit was allowed t0 move forward, and she ultimately reached a settlement
with the remaining co-defendants on her wrongful death claim. Allowing this case to proceed on
a new tort would require a jury t0 speculate regarding the comparative fault 0f the drivers and
What damages, if any, Ms. Raymond would have recovered had she proceeded t0 trial With a
hypothetical criminal conviction for Deputy Sloan. This is problematic for several reasons. It
3 Ms. Raymond’s claims 0f tortious interference with a prospective civil action and interference
with a prospective economic advantage are also attempts t0 plead around the tort of negligent
investigation, which has been expressly rejected in Idaho. Wimer v. State, 122 Idaho 923, 924-





would require astounding speculation on the part of the jury. A jury would be asked to ignore the 
many potential outcomes of both a criminal and civil trial, based on several factors, including the 
evidence presented, credibility of witnesses, jury instructions, rulings by the court, and argument 
presented by counsel. Ms. Raymond would then ask a jury to presume that, had such a 
prosecution gone forward and a jury convicted Deputy Sloan on the facts presented, she would 
have prevailed at trial, her damages would have been much greater, and her path to recover 
would have been much easier. Such hypotheticals and intangible damages are not the 
circumstances contemplated by the Restatement (Second) or by this Court when it considered a 
potential new tort for interference with a prospective civil action.  
In Hills v. United Parcel Serv., 232 P.3d 1049, 1058 (Utah, 2010), the Utah Supreme 
Court of Utah viewed favorably the policy reasons for adopting the independent tort for “third-
party spoliation,” but nevertheless declined to do so on the facts of that particular case. Similarly, 
this Court should not adopt a new tort for intentional interference with a civil action for 
spoliation of evidence on the facts of this case. 
IV. The district court properly dismissed Ms. Raymond’s claim for tortious 
interference with economic advantage. 
 
Ms. Raymond’s Complaint sets forth two “intentional interference” claims against ISP, 
both of which the district court dismissed for failure to state a claim. Ms. Raymond only argues 
on appeal that Count II of her Complaint was erroneously dismissed and that the Idaho Supreme 
Court should create an intentional tort, giving rise to that claim. It does not appear that Ms. 
Raymond is appealing the district court’s dismissal of her claim for intentional interference with 
prospective economic advantage. “Issues on appeal are not considered unless they are properly 
supported by both authority and argument.” Hurtado v. Land O'Lakes, Inc., 153 Idaho 13, 18, 
278 P.3d 415, 420 (2012). Nevertheless, for the same reasons as set forth above, Ms. Raymond’s
claim for tortious interference With prospective economic advantage was also properly dismissed
by the district court.
The elements for a claim of intentional interference with an economic expectancy are: (1)
The existence 0f a valid economic expectancy; (2) knowledge of the expectancy 0n the part of
the interferer; (3) intentional interference inducing termination of the expectancy; (4) the
interference was wrongful by some measure beyond the fact of the interference itself (i.e. that the
defendant interfered for an improper purpose 0r improper means) and (5) resulting damage t0 the
plaintiff whose expectancy has been disrupted. Highland Enterprises, Inc. v. Barker, 133 Idaho
330, 338, 986 P.2d 996, 1004 (1999) (emphasis added).
The district court dismissed Ms. Raymond’s claims for several reasons. First, the district
court determined that Ms. Raymond could not have a valid economic expectancy in her wrongful
death suit. The court further determined that Count held dismissal 0f Count III was warranted
because Ms. Raymond’s wrongful death action was premised 0n a fact she should not prove:
“That but for the Defendants’ alleged misconduct, Sloan would have been convicted of
manslaughter.” R. V01. I, p. 113. Finally, the district court held that Count III was prematurely
asserted because the outcome of her wrongful death case was not known at the time she filed her
claims against ISP. Id. For those reasons and those discussed below, the court’s dismissal 0f
Count III was not in error.
As set forth above, Ms. Raymond does not have standing to bring a claim for interference
with an economic advantage. As held by the district court, Ms. Raymond’s expectancy is based
on a hypothetical criminal conviction and how it could have impacted her ability t0 prove her
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wrongful death claim, Which had yet t0 be decided. Such reliance on hypothetical outcomes
cannot give rise to a valid economic interference claim.
Furthermore, Ms. Raymond’s Complaint did not sufficiently allege the essential elements
of an economic advantage claim. For the same reasons Ms. Raymond does not have standing t0
pursue her claim, she has not alleged a valid economic expectancy in her wrongful death lawsuit.
Her recovery is based 0n hypothetical outcomes 0f a criminal trial and her alleged “resulting
damages,” cannot be determined with any reasonable certainty and are based 0n speculation. See
Trilogy Network Sys., Inc. v. Johnson, 144 Idaho 844, 846, 172 P.3d 1119, 1121 (2007)
(damages must be proved with a reasonable certainty and the existence 0f damages “must be
taken out 0f the realm 0f speculation”). Such speculative injury cannot form the basis of a Llid
CCOHOIIliC CXDCCtanCV.
In addition, a civil lawsuit is not akin to the types of valid economic relationships that
have given rise to interference claims in Idaho. See, Highland Enterprises, Ina, 133 Idaho at
338, 986 P.2d at 1004 (1999) (plaintiff contractor alleged defendants’ protests interfered with its
expected profits); Wesco Autobody Supply, Inc. v. Ernest, 149 Idaho 881, 893, 243 P.3d 1069,
1081 (2010) (plaintiff employer alleged defendants intentionally interfered With its customer and
employee relationships); Syringa Networks, LLC v. Idaho Dep ’t 0fAdmin., 155 Idaho 55, 64, 305
P.3d 499, 508 (2013) (plaintiff telecommunications company alleged defendant
telecommunications company interfered With its ability t0 subcontract With a third party). See
also, Fox v. Country Mut. Ins. C0., 7 P.3d 677, 690 (Ore. 2000) (the purpose 0f such a claim is to
protect the integrity 0f “voluntagy economic relationships, both commercial and noncommercial,
that would have veg likely resulted in a pecuniary benefit t0 the plaintiff but for the defendant’s
interference”) (emphasis added); Cron v. Zimmer, 296 P.3d 567, 576 (Ore. 2013) (same).
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Ms. Raymond also fails t0 allege that her ability to prove her wrongful death case was
terminated, Which is an essential element t0 her claim. Highland Enterprises, Ina, 133 Idaho at
338, 986 P.2d at 1004. In fact, Ms. Raymond has acknowledged that her claim against Deputy
Sloan and Fayette County moved forward and that she reached an eventual settlement.
Accordingly, her economic advantage by definition was not terminated and thus, she has failed
to state a cognizable claim.
CONCLUSION
Defendant ISP respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court’s decision
dismissing With prejudice Ms. Raymond’s claims against ISP for tortious interference With a
prospective action and tortious interference With prospective economic advantage.
DATED this 3rd day 0f May, 2019.
MOORE, ELIA, KRAFT & HALL, LLP
Byz/s/ Michael J. Elia
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